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Abstract 
We consider a static search model with two types of workers, Nash bargaining, and free entry of firms. The matching 
function is specified so as cross-type congestion effects are asymmetric. Skilled workers create congestion effects for 
all, while unskilled workers do not affect the odds of employment for the skilled. An increase in the share of skilled 
workers has two effects on the welfare of the unskilled: a negative crowding-out effect, and a positive labor demand 
effect. The former (latter) effect dominates whenever the skill differential is small (large).
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     1 Introduction
This paper examines the following market situation. The labor market is frictional,
good workers are preferred to bad workers in the recruitment process, and the total num-
ber of available jobs depends on the pro￿tability of employment relationships. Do good
workers hurt bad workers in this environment? Gautier (2002) addresses this question in
a random matching model. Gautier￿ s model features skilled and unskilled workers who
compete for simple jobs. Once employed in such a job, skilled workers go on searching.
Skilled workers have two e⁄ects on job pro￿tability. First, they are more productive,
which increases pro￿tability though rent-sharing. Second, they quit jobs at faster rate,
which lowers pro￿tability. Whenever the former e⁄ect dominates the latter, the skilled
proportion boosts job creation. In turn, the rise in job availability bene￿ts to everyone
as random matching means that workers equally share job opportunities irrespective of
talent.1
The key feature of Gautier￿ s model is that the economic position of the unskilled
improves with the skilled proportion whenever ￿rms prefer to hire skilled workers, that
is whenever skilled workers are good and unskilled workers are bad. Then, the model
ambiguity is due to the fact that ￿ skilled￿does not necessarily mean ￿ good￿once accounted
for higher quit rates among the skilled. Gautier￿ s result is due to the random search
assumption. In random search models, congestion e⁄ects are symmetric and the matching
process is non-discriminant. Improving job availability must be good for all as no groups
of workers can disproportionately capture the new jobs. The purpose of the current note
is to revisit this relationship between the good proportion and the job opportunities of
the bad. In particular, I get rid o⁄ the random search assumption.
I consider a very stylized static search model with two types of workers, free entry of
￿rms, and Nash bargaining. As there is a single type of jobs, all workers seek for the same
jobs and skilled workers are unambiguously good for potential employers. Cross-type
congestion e⁄ects are asymmetric. Skilled workers create congestion e⁄ects for all. But
unskilled workers do not a⁄ect the odds of employment for the skilled. I show that an
increase in the skilled proportion has two e⁄ects on the welfare of the unskilled. On the
one hand, the positive labor demand e⁄ect, whereby the total number of advertised jobs
increases with the skilled proportion. This e⁄ect is very similar to Gautier. On the other
hand, the negative crowding-out e⁄ect, according to which the unskilled probability of get-
ting a job decreases at given number of jobs per job-seeker. I show that the crowding-out
e⁄ect is stronger than the labor demand e⁄ect if and only if the productivity di⁄erential
between skill groups is lower than a threshold value.
The crowding-out e⁄ect highlighted in this paper di⁄ers from Acemoglu (1999) and
Rosen and Wasmer (2005), in which holding a vacancy features an option value. In
these papers, an increase in the skilled proportion may have a negative impact on the
unskilled because ￿rms reject unskilled applications to make a better match in the future
(Acemoglu), or because unskilled wage goes down through wage bargaining (Rosen and
Wasmer). These papers make predictions that deeply di⁄er from mine. An increase in
the skill di⁄erential magni￿es the labor demand e⁄ect in my model, thereby improving
1See also Dolado et al (2009) who provide a matching model with on-the-job search and worker-￿rm
heterogeneity.
1the unskilled economic situation. A similar increase improves the value of a vacancy in
Acemoglu and Rosen and Wasmer, thereby deteriorating unskilled welfare.
The closest paper is Shi (2002) who considers a directed search model. There are two
types of jobs and two types of workers. Firms announce wages, workers observe wage o⁄ers
and send a single application. Firms can select among the pool of applicants, which lead
them to favor skilled workers. Shi shows that there are two types of equilibria: a pooling
equilibrium in which high-tech and low-tech ￿rms coexist, and a separating equilibrium
in which there are only high-tech ￿rms. The separating equilibrium is very close to the
equilibrium I study in this paper (the main di⁄erence relies on wage determination).
However, Shi only studies comparative statics for the pooling equilibrium, but does not
examine the properties of the separating equilibrium. I conjecture that one could reach a
similar result to mine in this case.2
The remaining of the paper is organized in two parts. Section 2 introduces the model,
while section 3 shows the results.
2 The model
I present a static matching model with two types of workers, a single type of job,
Nash bargaining over match surplus, and endogenous supply of jobs. The key assumption
relates to the matching technology: there is a unique search market, yet the unskilled do
not create congestion e⁄ects for the skilled.
There are two types of agents seeking a job: n1 skilled and n2 unskilled workers.
Agents di⁄er with respect to the amount of output they produce if employed. Type-i
agents produce 2yi. Let y2 = (1 ￿ ￿)y1, where ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0 is the skill premium.
There is a large number of ￿rms, each endowed with a single job slot which can be
either active or inactive. Each active job costs cy1 > 0, c 2 (0;1), and needs to be ￿lled
before production starts. Inactive jobs cost nothing.
Active jobs and job-seekers meet each other on the search market. Once a worker is
hired, she starts producing. The wage is bargained along symmetric Nash bargaining. As
the model is static and there is no unemployment income, this implies that each party
receives half output. Output sharing implies that pro￿t increases with skill. Firms prefer
to hire skilled workers as a result.
I now present the matching side of the model. Usually, the matching technology gives
the number of hires of each type as a function of the numbers of job-seekers and vacancies.
Formally, let Mi denote type-i hires, and mi be type-i-speci￿c matching technology. Then,
Mi = mi (n1;n2;v), i = 1;2. The matching technology generally features congestion
e⁄ects, as expanding individuals or jobs reduces the matching odds for individuals or jobs
of the same type. The crucial point then is whether the matching technology displays
cross-type congestion e⁄ects. When the search place is perfectly segmented by skill, we
have Mi = mi (ni;vi), with v1 + v2 = v. In this case, workers of a given type do not
create congestion e⁄ects on workers of the other type. When search is random, we have
2There are a number of directed search models with heterogeneous ￿rms/workers (see for instance
Shi, 2001, Lang and Manove, 2003, and Shimer, 2005). These models raise important issues, but do not
focus on the impact of changes in the composition of worker types on the extent of mismatch and the
crowding-out of lower-skilled workers.
2Mi = m(n1 + n2;v)ni=(n1 + n2). Cross-type e⁄ects are symmetric: at given number of
jobs, an increase in the number of type-i workers reduces the matching probability for
both types. Workers are equally likely to get a job and the number of hires accruing
to type-i workers is proportional to their share among the job-seekers. This is the case
analyzed by Gautier (2002).
The matching technology I consider features asymmetric cross-type congestion e⁄ects.
As in the random matching model, the aggregate number of hires M is determined by a
function whose inputs are the total number of job-seekers n1 + n2 on the one hand, and
the number of active jobs v on the other hand:
M ￿ minfm(n1 + n2;v);n1 + n2;vg (1)
The technology m is strictly increasing and strictly concave in each argument, and has
constant returns to scale. Hereafter, I only focus on market situations where M =
m(n1 + n2;v).
Unlike random matching, matches are not equally shared between workers￿types.
As ￿rms prefer skilled workers, the unskilled do not create congestion for the skilled.
Therefore,
M1 = m(n1;v) (2)
The unskilled get the residual number of hires:
M2 = m(n1 + n2;v) ￿ m(n1;v) (3)
The strict concavity of m guarantees M2 is strictly decreasing in n1 at given number of jobs.
Therefore, the skilled crowd-out the unskilled. Of course, by construction M1 +M2 = M,
which ensures that the number of jobs formed has constant returns to scale vis-￿-vis
job-seekers and vacancies.
The directed search model with worker heterogeneity is a particular case of the technol-
ogy I consider. This model provides an explicit scenario based on coordination frictions.
In this scenario, job-seekers observe available jobs, and each worker sends an application
to one of the v jobs. If the job receives a single application, the worker is employed. If
the job receives several applications, three cases may happen. If the worker is skilled, the
probability that s/he is hired is one divided by the number of skilled who applied for the
job. If the worker is unskilled and at least one skilled worker applied, the probability is
zero. If the worker is unskilled and no skilled applied, the probability is one divided by
the number of unskilled who applied. The probability that a given vacancy stays un￿lled
(respectively, not ￿lled with a skilled worker) is (1 ￿ 1=v)
n1+n2 (resp. (1 ￿ 1=v)
n1). Thus,
the number of (resp. skilled) hires is v
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1=v)
n1+n2￿
(resp. v [1 ￿ (1 ￿ 1=v)
n1]. As
v, n1 and n2 are su¢ ciently large, M = m(n1 + n2;v) = v [1 ￿ exp(￿(n1 + n2)=v)] (resp.
M1 = m(n1;v) = v [1 ￿ exp(￿n1=v)], the urn-ball matching technology. Unskilled hires
can be computed residually, i.e. M2 = M ￿ M1.
Let ￿i denote type-i workers￿probability of getting a job, and ￿i be ￿rms￿probability
of recruiting a type-i individual. The number of hires is equiprobably distributed within


























where x ￿ n1=(n1 + n2) is the share of skilled agents and ￿ ￿ v=(n1 + n2) is the market
tightness. Matching probabilities depend on market tightness ￿ and number of vacancies
per skilled worker ￿=x. For instance, the skilled matching probability ￿1 only depends
on the number of jobs per skilled workers. Skilled workers create congestion e⁄ects for
each other, while their employment prospects do not respond to changes in the number of
unskilled workers. Conversely, the unskilled are hurt by the presence of skilled workers.
The matching probability ￿2 is therefore decreasing in the skilled proportion x at given
tightness ￿.
Let wi denote the expected utility of type-i workers, and ￿ be ￿rms￿expected pro￿t:
wi = ￿iyi (8)
￿ = ￿1y1 + ￿2y2 ￿ cy1 (9)
Finally, the number of active jobs obeys the free-entry condition ￿ = 0.
3 Results
I solve the model and analyze the impacts of demographic changes on the welfare of
each skill group. The main result is the non-monotonic relationship between the share
of skilled workers and the welfare of unskilled individuals. Namely, there exists a unique
productivity di⁄erential above which the unskilled matching probability increases with
the skilled proportion, and below which it decreases.
Consider the following function   (z) ￿ m(1;z)=z, that is the recruitment probability.
It is strictly decreasing in z. From equations (6), (7) and (9), and constant returns to
scale in the matching technology, solving reduces to ￿nding market tightness ￿ such that
  (￿=x)￿ +   (￿)(1 ￿ ￿) = c (10)
The properties of the function   imply uniqueness whenever there exists an equilibrium,
which we assume.3 Equilibrium tightness decreases with the skill premium ￿=(1 ￿ ￿), and
increases with the skilled proportion x.
3This involves additional restrictions on the matching technology m and the job creation cost c.
One must check that matching probabilities are well de￿ned, i.e. lower than one. This is so whenever
m(1;￿=x) < 1, and m(1;￿)=￿ < 1. These conditions are always satis￿ed with the urn-ball technology.
In this case, there exists an equilibrium if and only if 0 < c < 1.
4What are the e⁄ects of x on the welfare of skilled and unskilled workers? To answer this
question, I need to compute how x alters skill-speci￿c matching probabilities. Consider
skilled workers. From (4), I have to ￿nd how changes in x alter the equilibrium ratio
z ￿ ￿=x. Using (10), I get
  (z)￿ +   (xz)(1 ￿ ￿) = c (11)
The variable z is strictly decreasing in x. Therefore, the welfare of skilled workers decreases
with their share in the workforce. This result is typical of directed search models with
mismatch (see Shi, 2002, for instance). This di⁄ers from random matching models where
the skilled actually bene￿t from an increase in their proportion.





























































where ￿(￿) = ￿m2 (1;￿)=m(1;￿) 2 (0;1) is the elasticity of the matching technology with
respect to the number of vacancies.
A change in the skilled proportion x has two con￿ icting e⁄ects on job opportunities for
the unskilled. On the one hand, there is a negative crowding-out e⁄ect. This is a partial
equilibrium e⁄ect due to the fact that the skilled are favored by the matching process. On
the other hand, there is a positive labor demand e⁄ect. It is a general equilibrium e⁄ect
whereby the total number of advertised jobs increases with the share of skilled workers.
Indeed, job creation is driven by pro￿tability, and rent-sharing implies job pro￿tability
increases with skill level. It follows equilibrium tightness positively responds to the skilled
share.
Which of these two e⁄ects is the largest? The answer depends on the skill premium ￿.
The labor demand e⁄ect is proportional to "￿;x ￿ x(d￿=dx)=￿, the elasticity of equilibrium








￿2 (1 ￿ ￿(￿))m(1;￿)
(1 ￿ ￿(￿=x))m(1;￿=x)
> 0 (16)
The higher the skill di⁄erential, the higher the labor demand e⁄ect. Suppose ￿rst ￿ = 0.
Then, all workers are equally productive. It follows that "￿;x = 0 and equilibrium tightness
does not respond to changes in the composition of the workforce. The labor demand e⁄ect
vanishes as a result. Then, the crowding-out e⁄ect implies that the welfare of unskilled
5workers strictly decreases with the skilled proportion. As ￿ increases, the elasticity of
equilibrium tightness with the skilled proportion increases too, and the magnitude of the



























which has the sign of
￿(x) = m(1;￿)[x + ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿)x] ￿ xm(1;￿=x) (18)
But ￿(0) > 0, ￿(1) = 0 and ￿
0 (x) = (1 ￿ ￿(￿))m(1;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(￿=x))m(1;￿=x) < 0
because m is strictly concave. Therefore, we have x(d￿2=dx)=￿2j￿=1 > 0. It follows that
there exists a unique skill di⁄erential b ￿ 2 (0;1) such that x(d￿2=dx)=￿2 > 0 if and only if
￿ > b ￿. In words, the labor demand e⁄ect dominates the crowding-out e⁄ect whenever the
skill di⁄erential is su¢ ciently large. This result holds for a very large class of matching
technologies, including the Cobb-Douglas function as well as the urn-ball technology.
4 Conclusion
I consider a static matching model with two types of workers, Nash bargaining, and
free entry of ￿rms. The matching function is speci￿ed so as cross-type congestion e⁄ects
are asymmetric. Skilled workers create congestion e⁄ects for all, while unskilled workers
do not a⁄ect the odds of employment for the skilled. An increase in the skilled proportion
has two e⁄ects on the welfare of the unskilled: a negative crowding-out e⁄ect, and a
positive labor demand e⁄ect. The former (latter) e⁄ect dominates whenever the skill
di⁄erential is small (large).
The model only requires there are good and bad workers from employers￿perspective.
However, good workers are not necessarily the most productive. The assumption that
there is a single type of jobs helps in this respect. There are a couple of papers with
several job types, e.g. Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), Shimer and Smith (2000), Shimer
(2005), Gautier and Teulings (2006), Gautier et al (2010). In those settings, match surplus
typically depends on the distance between worker and job types and usually it is not the
case (if production technology is su¢ ciently supermodular, i.e. log or root supermodular)
that ￿rms prefer the most productive workers. The reason is that better workers have a
higher outside option and they require compensation for this in the form of higher wages.
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